Saves and other statistics

Nicholas Beaudrot is exactly right:

...managers have adjusted their in-game strategy to maximize their closer's save opportunities rather than maximize their team's chances of winning. Yesterday Frank Francisco and Jonathan Broxton were brought in to protect three run leads in the ninth inning. This is good for my fantasy team, but not for their respective teams; you actually do the more to help your team's chance of winning by bringing in your best reliever when you're one run behind—to minimize the chance of your opponent getting a bigger lead—than you do by having the relief ace close out a game when three runs ahead. |Donkeylicious|

Time was, they called the closer "the fireman" and the closers job was to shut down a rally and bring the game home. You can really see the change in the way elite closers have been used if you look at outs per game in relief and runners inherited.

Below is a chart to which I've added those categories, plus GDP, which is a batting-against stat for grounded into double-play. To get a historical comparison, I compared Bruce Sutter and Dan Quisenberry, the elite closers of a previous generation, to the top save-earners from each league from 2004-08.

Closers past and present

Player	GR	SV	Out/GR	IR	GDP
Sutter -77	62	31	5.2	50	5
Sutter - 78	64	27	4.6	58	3
Sutter - 79	62	37	4.9	55	5
Quisenberry -80	75	33	5.1	89	18
Sutter 80	60	28	5.1	38	12
Quisenberry -82	72	35	5.7	36	17
Sutter - 82	70	36	4.4	54	12
Quisenberry -83	69	45	6	40	19
Sutter - 83	60	21	4.5	43	8
Quisenberry - 84	72	44	5.4	35	12
Sutter -84	71	45	5.2	48	18
Quisenberry - 85	84	37	4.6	71	15
Benitez - 04	64	47	3.3	23	3
Isringhausen -04	74	47	3.1	23	1
Rivera - 05	74	53	3.2	17	11
Cordero -05	74	47	3	21	3
Rodriguez - 05	66	45	3.1	14	1
Wickman - 06	64	45	2.9	4	11
Hoffman - 06	65	46	2.9	1	5
Rodriguez - 06	69	47	3.2	20	4
Valverde 07	65	47	3	7	5
Borowski - 07	69	45	2.9	8	1
Rodriguez - 08	76	62	2.7	18	5
Valverde - 08	74	44	2.9	16	0